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Introduction
A hybrid form of criminality has emerged from the traditionally distinct forms of organized
crime and terrorism to pose a new threat to law enforcement. Terrorist groups, once thought to
use proceeds from crime only to fund attacks, subsist largely off of the proceeds of sustained
narcotics business ventures, while criminal groups have mainstreamed the use of violent acts of
terror to torment and threaten communities into submission. In a dangerous form of competitive
adaption, crime and terror groups have embraced crossover style tactics and techniques that
foster an entrepreneurial network apparently capable of withstanding current law enforcement
attempts to weaken both groups financially. In places like Mexico, Central America, and Somalia
it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish illicit revenue streams, facilitators and front
companies that support terrorism from those that support crime. The financial convergence is so
severe that efforts to delineate the two will stymie law enforcement efforts to disrupt, dismantle
and eliminate crime and terror groups.
Rapid technological advances and the rise of entrepreneurialism have drastically changed the
societal landscape in which these groups operate. Technology has flattened and connected parts
of the world like never before, enabling the spirit of entrepreneurialism to stretch far into the
criminal underworlds. Financial intelligence (FININT) is a valuable tool that law enforcement
can use to keep pace with the continuously evolving adversary and disrupt efforts to fund illicit
activity. Current initiatives to exploit this valuable source of intelligence can be enhanced at the
state and local levels. This paper will highlight how FININT can be incorporated into analytic
and investigative roles, provide an overview of historical and future uses of FININT and suggest
innovative teaching strategies.

Financial Intelligence
Financial intelligence is financial information about individual and business transactions
produced by financial institutions and reported to the Department of Treasury’s Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN).1 More specifically, FININT is Currency Transaction Reports
(CTRs), Cross Border Currency or Monetary Instrument Reports (CMIRs), a Report of Foreign
Bank Account (FBAR), Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) and Form 8300 (issued by FinCEN
and the Internal Revenue Service). Each report carries its own requirements; should a transaction
or incident meet a threshold or series of criteria, financial institutions and other regulated entities
are required by law to report the activity or transactions to the government. For more information
see Table 1 (FININT Report).2
1

The list of financial institutions required to comply is available at:
http://fincen.gov/forms/bsa_forms/index.html#FinCENReports.
2
United States Department of the Treasury. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. FinCENs Mandate from
Congress: 31 U.S.C. 310 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010), available at:
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title31/html/USCODE-2010-title31-subtitleI-chap3-subchapI-

393
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, No. 5

FININT is produced by the private sector, required by law and heavily regulated through a series
of anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing measures. FININT, reported on the
aforementioned forms, is ultimately a record of financial transaction or series of transactions that
involved one or more financial institutions and was identified through surveillance, due diligence
and/or investigative action by any one of the financial institutions. FININT, in its many forms
may contain personal identifying information, account details, dates, times, dollar amounts, and
transaction history.
SARs, by design, were invented to serve as the financial community’s confidential reporting
method for law enforcement.3 Financial institutions are required to file them if financial
transactions or subject activity meets certain specific thresholds or is otherwise determined
“suspicious.” However, because of the demand placed upon financial institutions by the
government, there is room for some discretion when it comes to filing SARs; in many cases
financial institutions go above and beyond SAR guidance and produce reports for an extremely
large range of activity.
SARs are typically several pages in length; the first several pages contain boxes for personal
identifying information, account details, dates and dollar amounts. The last page of the SAR is
for the narrative; a critical part of the report. SAR narratives require a good deal of analytic
prowess to produce and often serve as a lead into suspected criminal activity. Good SARs reflect
an accurate reporting of financial transactions and suspicious activity, any details that are
necessary to support the filing, analytical capability to triangulate sources, and research and
investigative prowess to identify, pursue and exhaust leads. Some SARs are filed for the
“potential” of yet to be realized investigative value, while others may end up forming the
foundation of major investigations. Others still may just be a blip or notation.4
Table 1: FININT Report.
CTR
Report of a cash transaction over $10,000. Financial institutions are required by law
to complete the CTR form, properly identify persons conducting transactions and
submit the form to the FinCEN and maintain appropriate records of financial
transactions.5
CMIR
• Required when a person physically transports, mails, or ships, or causes to
be physically transported, mailed, or shipped currency or other monetary
instruments in an aggregate amount exceeding $10,000 at one time from the
United States to any place outside the United States or into the United States
from any place outside6.
• Or when a person is the recipient of other monetary instruments in an
sec310.htm.; United States Department of the Treasury. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. US PATRIOT Act
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001), available at: http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/.
3
Steve Gurdak, “The Trouble with SARs,” ACAMs Today (March – May 2010): 23, available at:
http://files.acams.org/ACAMS_Today/Mar10-May10/trouble_w_sars.pdf.
4
Steve Gurdak, “No Bad SARs,” ACAMS Today 11:3 (June – August 2012): 33-34, available at:
http://acamstoday.org/wordpress/wp-content/themes/widezine/assets/AT_PDFs/AT_v11_n3.pdf.
5
Required by the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (now referred to as the Bank Secrecy Act).
6
The original amount required for a CMIR was $5,000. It was increased to $10,000 in the Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act Amendments contained in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.
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aggregate amount exceeding $10,000 that had been transported, mailed, or
shipped to the person from outside the United States.
FBAR

SAR

If a U.S. person has a financial interest in or signature authority over at least one
financial account located outside of the United States; and the aggregate value of all
foreign financial accounts exceeded $10,000 at any time during the calendar year to
be reported.7
•
•
•

•
8300

Required if insider abuse of any amount is suspected.
Violations aggregating $5,000 or more where a suspect can be identified.
Violations aggregating $25,000 or more regardless of a potential suspect
Transactions aggregating $5,000 or more that involve potential money
laundering or violations of the Bank Secrecy Act.
Computer intrusion has occurred.

Must be filed if a person engaged in a trade or business receives cash in excess of
$10,000, in any 12 month period, in a single transaction or in two or more related
transactions with the IRS within 15 days of the transaction.8

Keeper of FININT

FinCEN, established in 1990, was created to serve as the national repository for FININT and was
tasked with collection, analysis and dissemination of actionable intelligence for proactive
investigation. Essentially every type of FININT that is completed by a financial institution is
submitted to FinCEN, stored on servers and accessible to law enforcement and authorized
personnel through direct access to a database or through a remote access “Gateway.” Beyond
serving as a data repository, FinCEN is tasked with providing tactical and strategic assistance to
local, state and federal law enforcement in regard to financial crimes. FinCEN also serves as the
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) for the United States and its mission has expanded to include
safeguarding the financial system from illicit use and combat money laundering and promotion
of national security through the collection, analysis, and dissemination of financial intelligence
and strategic use of financial authorities.9
Value to Law Enforcement

FININT is valuable because it provides insight into the income, expenses, assets, business
activities, social and business networks, associates, travel and other activities of individuals and
businesses. The existence of a SAR on an individual or business is not always overtly indicative
of criminal activity and in some instances it has been produced by a financial institution for
7

United States Department of the Treasury. Internal Revenue Service. Report of Foreign Bank and Financial
Accounts (FBAR) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011), available at:
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Report-of-Foreign-Bank-and-FinancialAccounts-(FBAR).
8
United States Department of the Treasury. Internal Revenue Service. Bank Secrecy Act (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 2012), available at: http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-026-010.html.
9
United States Department of the Treasury. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. FinCENs What We Do
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2012), available at: http://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd/.
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defensive reasons or with no apparent purpose.10 When synchronized with other forms of
intelligence, however, the FININT may provide law enforcement with sufficient evidence to
proactively launch or continue investigations into an array of criminal activities that include
organized crime, gangs, drug trafficking, terrorism, trafficking in stolen or counterfeit goods,
piracy, copyright infringement, child pornography, human trafficking, alien smuggling and bulk
cash smuggling.
Every law enforcement investigation and analysis should contain a financial component.
Whether transactions are detailed in FININT or identified on a rental car receipt, specific
financial information should be documented by investigators and analysts and captured in
intelligence reports for future use. Additionally, investigators should always question suspects
about the nature of their financial activities; in some instances the suspects may be more willing
to talk about money than about the alleged criminal activity.
Intelligence analysts should also include FININT and financial information as one of the many
sources of intelligence. FININT can be useful in identifying hidden or offshore accounts and
assets, travel patterns, additional property, sources of income, associates, habits and expenses. If
an intelligence analyst collates data on a target’s income and cross references it against known
expenses they may find discrepancies that are indicative of additional criminal activity such as
money laundering, tax evasion or mortgage fraud.
How is it Used?

FININT, also commonly referred to within the industry as BSA data, is of tremendous value to
law enforcement for investigation. FinCEN has over 180 million records of financial transactions
and other reports in its possession that can be used proactively, retroactively or reactively and
strategically.11 FININT has retroactively aided law enforcement in identifying motives,
associations, and links to people, places and underlying criminal activity. Traditional proactive
uses of FININT include data queries to identify anomalies, suspect patterns and trends that can
be used to prevent criminal activity.12 FININT can also be used strategically to identify larger
patterns on a wider scale.
The El Dorado Task Force (EDTF) and the New York and New Jersey High Intensity Financial
Crimes Area (NY/NJ HIFCA), are two examples of how FININT is analyzed and used for
proactive and reactive investigation and strategic purposes.
Formed in 1992 by the U.S. Customs Service and the President’s Office of National Drug
Control Policy, the EDTF is tasked with aggressively targeting financial crimes in a designated
geographic area. The EDTF, made up of members of local, State and Federal law enforcement
agencies in the New York and New Jersey area, uses FININT to investigate financial crime at all
10

Many financial institutions will produce “defensive” suspicious activity reports in an effort to avoid regulatory
scrutiny at a later date.
11
Calvery, Jennifer Shasky. "Remarks of Jennifer Shasky Calvery." National Cyber-Forensics Training Alliance
Cyfin 2013 Conference . Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh. 16 Apr 2013. available
at: http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/speech/html/20130416.html.
12
Cassara, John and Avi Jorisch, On the Trail of Terror Finance: What Law Enforcement and Intelligence Officers
Need to Know (Arlington, VA: Red Cell Intelligence Group, 2010).
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levels using an approach dubbed, “Cornerstone”. Through Cornerstone, agents assigned to the
task force work with the financial sector to identify and eliminate vulnerabilities, as well as to
develop and share typologies and criminal methodologies.13 The coordination enables EDTF to
better incorporate the use of FININT into a proactive investigation strategy.
The NY/NJ HIFCA is a significant component of the EDTF and is responsible for analyzing
FININT, financial data and other types of records in support of proactive investigative efforts.14
The HIFCA, a Congressional designation, concentrates law enforcement efforts at the federal,
state, and local levels on high intensity money laundering zones.15 The NY/NJ HIFCA’s mission
is to conduct strategic analysis of FININT, provide case support for criminal investigations with
a money laundering nexus, interact with the private sector through outreach efforts, and
participate in monthly SAR review meetings.16
Recommended Enhancements

•

Increase financial resources for law enforcement. Investigations into money laundering,
terrorist financing and other types of financial crimes are intense and require a substantial
time and resource commitment on the part of the investigating agency. Money laundering
schemes are complex and demand extensive analysis of FININT and financial
information; many agencies are unable to devote analysts and investigators to such a
lengthy pursuit. Additionally, many investigators and analysts may lack specific skill sets
required to deconstruct detailed financial transactions, identify facilitation tools, tradebased money laundering, unlicensed money remitters or shell companies.17 Simply put,
agencies need more money and more resources to pursue financial crimes investigations.

•

Increased training for state and local law enforcement. Training such as the FEMA
Terrorism Prevention Exercise Program’s Advanced Analytic Techniques Workshop and
the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program (SLATT), both of which focused
on terrorist financing investigations, should be funded and made available to law
enforcement agencies.

Going Forward

•

FinCEN must make better use of its data. The agency’s repository of BSA data
contains critical FININT that can be used to better understand, map and track the
financial structures of drug trafficking organizations, illicit networks and transnational
criminal organizations. Strategic level analysis if FININT synchronized with SIGINT and
HUMINT can lead to increased knowledge about how organizations, indigenous financial

13

“Conerstone.” Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2013, available at: http://www.ice.gov/cornerstone/.
“The Road to Eldorado.” Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2013, available at:
http://www.ice.gov/cornerstone/eldorado.htm.
15
These identified zones are available at: http://www.fincen.gov/law_enforcement/hifca/index.html#map_hifca.
16
Wager, Daniel, "Convergence of Financial Crimes: Fraud, Terrorism Financing and Money Laundering." SAS.
Department of Homeland Security: New York HIFCA. New York City, New York. 2009. Lecture, available at:
http://www.sas.com/events/cm/647913/DanWagerPanel1Speaker4.pdf.
17
These have all been identified as vulnerabilities and loopholes in the financial system that are currently exploited
by crime and terror groups. For more information see the Senate Drug Caucus report, The Buck Stops Here (April
2013), available at: http://www.drugcaucus.senate.gov/reports.html.
14
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techniques and social networks change, evolve and adapt over time and in response to
law enforcement. FinCEN must take all the necessary steps to push out relevant analysis
to state and local law enforcement agencies.
•

HIFCAs should use FININT to increase knowledge about specific financial crime
trends at a local, state and regional level. Better understood and well defined financial
crime hotspots can assist local, state and federal law enforcement with investigative
efforts and crime control. Analysts can be tasked to geo map activity and marry it with
other crime data to identify patterns, trends and actors and present their findings to the
area task forces. This level of tactical analysis can increase the understanding of a
criminal organization’s decision-making hierarchy and vulnerable sources of revenue and
expenditure. For example, analysts, using FININT and their in-depth knowledge of a
local community, behaviors, social networks and finances, may be able assist with the
identification of an illegal money remitter operating as a hawala.18

•

FinCEN should designate HIFCAs as the primary point of contact for tactical
analysis of SARs. This should help streamline analysis of FININT and help minimize
redundancy.
Increased cross-HIFCA coordination. HIFCA Directors and members should establish
a method of communication amongst themselves. Communication between HIFCAs will
provide analysts a forum where information sharing can occur and promote pattern and
linkage identification across geographic areas and a strategic level understanding of
FININT in order to better understand FININT at a strategic level.

•

Law enforcement and analysts should include a financial component to every
investigation and analysis. This can occur through increased collection of data during,
interviews, inquiries and research. The information and details collected can be
incorporated into the case file and made available to other investigators or law
enforcement agencies upon request.

Teaching Strategies
Continued education and training opportunities are one of the most important ways that law
enforcement can stay relevant as criminals and terrorists continue to exploit technological
advances and pursue entrepreneurialism. A number of researchers have shown that criminals and
terrorists have converged and now share many of the same tactics, techniques and procedures.19
Educating law enforcement on the role of FININT in the criminal financing process is critical to
their success in disrupting and dismantling these illegal enterprises.

18

Hawala’s have been identified as a facilitation tool for terrorist financiers and money launders. To operate legally
within the U.S. the money service business must be registered with FinCEN. For more information see the 2007
U.S. Money Laundering Strategy and the 2005 U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment.
19
Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised
Crime and Terrorism,” Global Crime 6:1 (2004): 129-145; John T. Picarelli, “Osama bin Corleone? Vito the Jackal?
Framing Threat Convergence Through an Examination of Transnational Organized Crime and International
Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24:2 (2012): 180-198.
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Educators should therefore offer courses that involve the use of scenarios, table top and red team
exercises that focus on investigative strategy as well as what crime committed in the future will
look like. Training and workshops should also involve a “lessons learned” component during
which time law enforcement and instructors can review case studies and discuss investigative
techniques, i.e. what works, what hasn’t worked and what might work. A few good exercises
include:
•

Situational Exercises. FININT training that involves situational exercises where law
enforcement and analysts work through fictional “scenarios” enables educators to
reinforce learning points by allowing the participants to work through problem sets. In
these instances, law enforcement and analysts should work in small groups and be
encouraged to work creatively and collaboratively with one another. Ideally, each group
should have an equal number of analysts and law enforcement that will work together on
one long term scenario that incorporates both investigative and analytic techniques.
Shorter scenarios that don’t involve group work and are completed by the entire class at
once can be used but are not as likely to foster the kind of interagency, group
participation that may occur during a longer exercise. Scenarios can be based upon prior
events or can be completely fictional.

•

Table Top Exercises (TTXs) also involve a case or scenario; however in a TTX
participants are each assigned a role, “play” at the same time and focus on procedures and
methodology instead of solving a case. TTX’s are frequently used to test internal
protocol, interagency coordination and operational security, and can be applied to an
investigative scenario involving the use of FININT in much the same way. For example,
investigators and analysts could work through a case (the table top exercise) with a stated
goal of reviewing each investigative step, analytic approach, case management and
reporting technique. Participants would discuss their methodology and decision-making
instead of case facts. The TTX would help law enforcement and analysts identify
assumptions and biases, understand investigative strategies, refine techniques, and
improve working relationships.

•

Red Teaming is the practice of viewing a problem from an adversarial or contrarian
point of view.20 In a learning exercise, a red team should play or model the attacker, the
opponent, or simply a devil’s advocate, while a blue team should play law enforcement.
A red team, for example, might test the security of a system, or, in the case of FININT, a
red team could work to create an illegal enterprise and launder money. The point of the
exercise is to challenge assumptions and identify the situations in which mindsets are
fixed; this is an opportunity to go places beyond the wildest of imaginations. Tactics and
techniques used by adversaries are not limited by borders, institutional biases and
structural impediments. Red teaming can help free law enforcement and analysts from
their own well-developed mental model—their own sense of rationality, cultural norms,
and personal values. 21

20

Mark Mateski, “Red Teaming: A Balance View,” Red Team Journal (Bebruary 14, 2013), available at:
http://redteamjournal.com/2013/02/red-teaming-a-balanced-view/.
21
Heuer, R. J., and R. H. Pherson. Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis (Washington D.C.: CQ
Press, 2012).
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Conclusion
Globalization and communications technology have provided crime and terror networks with the
capacity to expand their operations and connections far beyond the boundaries of their given
conflict zones.22 In response to law enforcement efforts, transnational criminal organizations
have begun to embrace a hybrid form of entrepreneurialism in order to expand operations. A
renewed appreciation for and analysis of FININT could provide law enforcement an opportunity
to better understand how the illicit networks operate, make decisions, compartmentalize
activities and sustain themselves over time. Increased resources and training in addition to
incorporation of innovative teaching strategies such as red teaming would allow state and local
law enforcement an opportunity to contribute to disruption and dismantling of hybrid criminal
groups and other forms of illicit networks.

22

Peters, Grechen. "The Intersection of Crime and Conflict." Trans. Array The “New” Face of Transnational Crime
Organizations (TCOs): A Geopolitical Perspective and Implications to U.S. National Security (Washington, D.C.:
Kiernan Group Holdings, 2013): 81-85, available at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=733208.
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